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Agriculture's persistent problems continue to  impede economic reform in
the USSR, and undermine public confidence  in perestroika's potential.
Empty shelves in state  food stores and rising prices elsewhere
disproportionately  influence public assessment of the  economic reform.
Residents  in one fifth of 445 cities  sampled in 1989 reported coupon
rationing for meat, and rationing of sugar was universal.1 The volume of
food imports rose in 1989,  domestic production also increased, but a major
deterioration in distribution kept the amount of food marketed unchanged
from 1988.  Sharply higher world food prices  increased the cost of
imports, and diverted funds away from technological modernization in
agriculture and industry.  Agriculture retains  20%  of the total  labor
force and absorbs  17%  of total investment, yet this commitment of
resources has failed to meet rising demand for food and fiber.  The
chronic financial crisis  drains funds from  the state budget and the
banking system, and is  a conduit through which excess money supply passes
into circulation.
Despite agriculture's centrality to the reform process, efforts  to
implement reform in the sector began late.  Not until late  1987 was
Gorbachev's initial  ineffective agricultural policy put to serious
scrutiny and found wanting.  Deteriorating agricultural finances  at the
farm level and in the state budget triggered a reassessment of
agricultural policy throughout 1988.
1The reassessment culminated in an effort,  launched by endorsement of
contract leasing at the March  (1989) Plenum, radically to  change land
tenure and contractual relations of traditional collectivized agriculture.
The leasing program was rapidly followed by more radical  tenure
arrangements, including the  individual proprietorship  (sanctioned in the
draft land law in December, 1989),  and private ownership of agricultural
land (under consideration  in early 1990  for inclusion in a revised land
law).
Tenure issues occupied most of the  attention of the reformers in 1989.
The changes are very important, but without reform of pricing, marketing,
and input supply, new tenurial arrangements function poorly.  Few
producers have taken advantage of the new opportunities,  and tenure change
alone will not be a source of the much needed agricultural supply
response.  The emphasis  on increasingly radical tenure reform does not
address the needs of the better state and collective farms  for more
rational prices, input supply, open marketing channels, and consumption
goods for the countryside.  The  short term supply response will have to
come from these  farms, but their potential for  improvement is  still
untapped as  unreformed prices and input rationing favor marginal farms.
Moreover, radical  tenure reforms profoundly threaten the assets  of state
and collective farms.  The  reform's failure so  far to benefit the better
state and collective farms appears  to be pushing them closer to
conservative defenders of a status quo who offer only a dismal
continuation of policies that have hobbled the  farms  in the past.
Many people perceive the food situation to be worsening, rather than
improving.  Food problems are  real, not figments of  consumers'
2imaginations.  Yet the heightened sense of crisis cannot be attributed to
supply problems alone.  Production of most products  increased moderately
in the latter half of the 1980's.  Production of grain, meat, and milk
rose  substantially, although not enough to meet production and consumption
targets.  The food economy's vulnerability to macroeconomic  imbalance and
a deteriorating transportation system brought  the worsened shortages.
Excess money supply shows up  immediately in food markets, particularly in
larger cities where people travel in search of consumer goods.
Nationalist tensions,  strikes, work slowdowns, and localized fuel
shortages disrupted transport and worsened distribution of domestic and
imported food.
Inflationary shortages  and transportation bottlenecks  this year added
to  the chronic problems of Soviet agriculture;  rising costs of production,
waste and loss at all  stages, financial stress,  and disequilibrium in
consumer markets.  The  Soviet Union enters  the 1990s with an agricultural
economy lacking the positive  impact of sectoral reform, and additionally
burdened by macroeconomic mismanagement and deteriorating transport.
Supply:  Production. International Trade and Domestic Distribution
Grain production in the last half of the  1980s  increased 15%  over the
average for the first half.  Production of sugar beets and vegetable  oil
also  increased, as  shown in Table 1.  Meat production rose 19%  over  the
period, and increases for milk and eggs were  also sizeable.
Table 1 shows declines  in production of potatoes and fruits,  and
stagnant levels  for cotton and vegetables.  The disastrous effect of the
temperance campaign on grape vineyards can be seen in the  20% decline in
average production between the  two periods.  Since grapes are perennial,
3the decline continued between 1988  and 1989  even though the  campaign
slackened.
Production problems contribute  to  shortages of fruits, potatoes, and
vegetables, but in aggregate the production figures  do not confirm the
rising sense of crisis.  Distribution, on the other hand, changed
dramatically over  the past year.  Transport bottlenecks and nationalist
tensions  disrupted internal trade, but the  call for regional  self-
sufficiency issued last spring probably had a greater  impact.  At the
March Plenum and afterward Gorbachev exhorted local  party leaders to rely
less on feed delivered from the all-union fund, and to  do more  to meet
their own needs for food and feed from local  sources:  "As I already said,
a dramatic increase in the  role and responsibility of regions,  districts,
provinces, and republics in solving problems of food supply  is  an integral
part of our agricultural policy  . Here we must, and I repeat, decisively
overcome dependency  [on supplies  from the center]". 2
Encouragement of self-sufficiency was intended to spur local
production, but  instead farm managers and local officials dramatically
reduced deliveries  to  the all-union fund, leaving state orders unfilled to
secure  their own feed supply.  The liquidation of the national level
super-ministry Gosagroprom (March, 1989),  and devolution of powers to  the
republics may also have encouraged regional  self-sufficiency at the
expense of the all-union fund.  Fifty nine million tons of grain were
delivered in fulfillment of state orders,  instead of the 86 million
expected.
Grain procurements at that level adjusted ten percent for dockage and
waste just cover the  53 million tons needed for food and industrial
4purposes.  In 1990  the feed dispensed by the central government thus will
not exceed the  level of imports, although much of the imported food grain
will  substitute for feed quality procurements.  All the remaining grain
appears  to be under control of the republic level authorities  or  the
farms,  themselves.  Vladilen Nikitin, Chairman of the  State Commission for
Food and Procurement, reported at the February  (1990) Plenum on the
shortage of grain in the all-union fund:
The  fact  is  that we were simply unable to procure as much grain as was
called for in the plan confirmed by the Supreme  Soviet.  There wasn't
that much grain.  And we were unable  to buy abroad the additional five
million tons needed to maintain our commitments to  the republics.
Today the situation is  simply that there  is  no grain.  I am forced, in
order to proceed correctly, to  reduce delivery quotas of meat from this
grain.  The grain is not there because we do not have the means.3
When he made  the statement, the country had harvested a good grain crop
in 1989,  imported one million more tons  in 1989  than 1988,  and 1990's
imports were clogging the harbors  for want of transport to the interior.
State procurements  of grain fell one  third short of plan in 1989, but
farms that either kept their own grain or sold it  to a buyer  other than
the  state did not necessarily make poor use of it.  Nikitin may have
spoken in order to dramatize the need for more hard currency for
agricultural  imports;  the agricultural trade in the U.S.  was concerned in
mid February, 1990, when Soviet buyers did not make payments  for grain on
time.
The demise of the all-union fund as a source of feed is  problematical
only because wholesale  trade is  not yet developed to  take its  place.  With
large quantities of grain at the disposition of republic level authorities
or farm chairmen, genuine wholesale trade at negotiated prices could take
a quantum leap  in 1990. Managers  of livestock operations dependent on feed
5from the all-union fund are already complaining loudly about the cutback
in their deliveries  of feed.  Their complaints may be taken as  evidence of
a shortage  in supply, when in fact they signal  instead a change  in
marketing regimes.
Deliveries of meat and milk to  the all-union fund  fell short of
expectations  in 1989,  although by a lesser margin than did grain.
Nikitin's reduction in delivery quotas for 1990 may make little
difference, since producers appear on their own volition to be delivering
less.  Meat producing  regions are reluctant to  offer animal products  to
the central government under current pricing policies.  In the past the
republic budget paid the subsidy on meat delivered to  the all-union fund
and then was reimbursed by transfers from the national budget.
Negotiations on republic  level economic  autonomy in the Baltic republics,
and perhaps in others as well, cast doubt on that reimbursement as  a
continued budget item.  Without reimbursement,  the producing regions
recover only one half to  one-third of the cost of delivering meat  to  the
all-union fund.  The emphasis on regional  self-sufficiency, universal
excess demand for animal products, plus  the greater likelihood that
exporters would lose money on products delivered to the all-union fund may
explain the  shortfall  in deliveries.  It was 5% in 1989, but could be
greater  in 1990 if feed shortages persist and price policy is  not changed.
Food imports remained high throughout the  last half of the 1980s,  as
shown in Table 2.  Grain imports neared record highs in 1985,  fell in the
following year, and fluctuated above and below 35 million tons  for the
last three years.  Imports of meat, vegetables, fruit, and sugar remained
at stable  relatively high levels.  Imports of oilseeds and meal spiked in
61986 and 1987 with the decision to  try soy as  a protein supplement again.
Analysts of Soviet grain trade have tried for years to establish a
predictive  link between grain imports and domestic production, herd size,
hard currency earnings, and other factors  linked either empirically or by
common sense  to purchases of grain abroad.  The  simple link between
imports and procurements reported by Christian Foster and Ed Cook tells  an
interesting story.4 Regression analysis  indicates that when procurements
during a calendar year  (including both winter and spring grain harvests)
deviate  from the prior year's level, imports  during the July to June  trade
year roughly compensate for the difference.
This  linkage  is  no more helpful as  a predictive formula than were past
estimates, since  the future  is unlikely to be an extrapolation of
processes driving trade in the  1970s  and 1980s.  It is useful, however,
because  it highlights  the role of imports  as  compensation for shortfalls
in domestic marketing activity, rather than production.  The  state imports
grain in order  to  supply users and processors more closely linked to
foreign suppliers  (through Exportkhleb) than to domestic producers.  The
situation is particularly stark this year, when, with a relatively
abundant crop, the state has failed to move it  into the all-union fund for
redistribution.
Cheap grain in the mid 1980s  and subsidized imports after 1985 reduced
the costs  of postponing marketing reforms, but the cheap grain is now
gone.  World wheat  stocks are about 20% of annual world use.  The stocks
to use ratio has not been this low since the global  shortages of 1973-4,
and the drought continues  in much of the American midwest.  Grain prices
have turned sharply higher, as  shown in Table  3.  The per unit subsidy on
7EEP wheat has dropped from about $40/ton in May of 1986  to  $20  in March of
1989,  and since  then to  $10.  The purchase of some  Soviet domestic grain
for hard currency  (at approximately half the world price for commercially
traded unsubsidized wheat) had very little effect on domestic
procurements;  purchases  for hard currency constituted less than 1% of
domestic procurements of high quality wheat.
Consumption and  the Demand Side
Per capita average consumption of major food items  (except fruits and
vegetables)  is  reported to have  increased in the  last half of the 1980s,
and so did consumer dissatisfaction.  These apparently paradoxical
developments demonstrate again that the  food problem cannot be solved
solely on the supply side.
Average consumption of major  items  is shown  in Table 4.  The national
averages  conceal wide regional variations  in diet, due  to differences in
demography,  income levels, and access to rationed commodities.  For
example, meat consumption in the Baltic republics  is about  80 kilograms
per capita, and in Uzbekistan only 29.5 Uzbek per capita consumption of
a number of products has declined  since 1985,  and meat consumption does
not differ much  from levels  in China.
Even in areas relatively well supplied with food, excess  demand grew in
the  last half of the  1980s.  In 1989 money incomes  rose by 12.8 percent
over  1988.  Production of meat and milk, for which income elasticities are
still high, increased 1 percent in the  same period.  More people came to
Moscow, Leningrad,  and major cities  in the Baltic republics  in search of
consumer electronics, housewares, and clothing, and their arrival added to
disequilibrium in food markets there.  In some areas purchase of non-food
8items  is restricted to  local residents  identified by passport.  To  the
extent that  this rationing is effective,  it shifts demand to food markets.
The  excess demand is  evident in prices on collective farm markets that
exceed official state prices by a widening margin, as  shown in Table 5.
Consumers'  increased reliance  on collective farm markets  (with rising
prices) and consumer cooperatives  (with prices higher  than official state
levels)  has accustomed many to movements in food prices  that should ease
the psychological  adjustment to eventual price reform.  The  impact of
reform on family budgets will be less,  as well, since many families are
already paying prices much higher than official  state prices.
Conditions in food markets make official  targets for consumption norms
shown in Table 4 irrelevant.  People  in the Baltic republics have already
reached the consumption norm and those  in poorer parts  of the country are
far from it, yet neither group  is  satisfied.  This  year's consumption
targets will not be met;  their use as  an evaluative standard for
performance of the agricultural economy is  symptomatic of the single-
minded focus  on supply that has thwarted effective policy reform to date.
The consumption data relate only to quantities.  Consumers' regularly
complain about quality, and random checks  conducted by the  state's trading
inspectors  show a remarkable doubling and sometimes tripling since 1985 of
food products found to  be substandard and either marked down or removed
from trade.6 The deterioration in 1989  is  substantial, and may be  linked
with the general decline  in distribution and marketing.
The Financial  Crisis
In December, 1989,  Finance Minister V. S. Pavlov announced that 73.5
billion rubles (approximately half of outstanding farm debt) would be
9written off  (Sovetskaia Rossiia, December 7, 1989).  The growth of  farm
debt in the  1980s  as  a proportion of total bank indebtedness is  shown in
Table  6.
The write-off is  in some respects of little consequence, since the
inflationary impact of bad agricultural  lending has already been absorbed,
and there was  little likelihood that  these debts would be  recovered.  The
write-off could have a major impact on future  inflation, however.  In past
write-offs,  such as  the smaller one that accompanied the passage of the
Food Program in 1982  (9.7 billion rubles),  the lending capacity of the
banking system was augmented by the amount of the write-off,  since funds
frozen in bad debts were released.  The current write-off will trigger a
new round of inflationary lending unless both borrowers and lenders are
subject to greater controls than they have been in the past.
Conditions attached to  the debt relief do not appear  to require genuine
financial restructuring at the farm level.  Farms that received fallout
from Chernobyl and those recently converted to  agricultural subsidiaries
of industrial enterprises will have all debt unconditionally forgiven.
Others can write off debt  in the  same proportion as  they lease out their
assets under lease contracts.  The measure is  intended both to encourage
and pressure recalcitrant managers to offer land, equipment, and animals
to  potential leaseholders.
The conditionality raises  two interesting questions.  How will genuine
leaseholds be distinguished from pro forma reorganizations?  Applications
for debt write-off will be reviewed administratively at the raion
(district)  level in an effort  to weed out  the bogus ones, but  it is
difficult to distinguish new forms of contractual relations  from old even
10under a review process with the highest degree of objectivity and
integrity.  The objective of the leasing program is  to  give  the
leaseholder decision-making autonomy and financial  responsibility.  The
most common form of leasing encouraged to date  is  the targeted intra-farm
leasehold  (Brooks, 1990).  This binds  the lessee closely to  the parent
farm, and the degree of  the leaseholder's autonomy can be seen only as  the
manager's behavior is  revealed in implementation of the contract.
If the debt write-off releases more funds  for agricultural lending, who
will get the loans?  In the past collective and state farm managers have
been effective lobbyists  for loans.  Will they continue  to  receive  liberal
credit, and allow it to trickle down to  leaseholders at  their discretion?
Or will direct credit lines allow leaseholders a modicum of independence?
In recent months banks have had an increasing number of applications for
loans  from small leaseholders and proprietors.  Bank administrators
complain that their payoff from these small  loans at  low interest rates
does not justify the time required to  process  them.  Reform of
agricultural  financial institutions  and lending practices to prevent an
inflationary new round of lending and serve a new clientele of small
holders has not yet been initiated.
According to the latest published timetable,  "toward the end of 1991
bankrupt collective and state farms  will be reorganized as individual
farms, cooperatives, etc."7 The debt write-off intended to  spur tenurial
reforms may in fact retard more radical reorganizations.  It will be
difficult to recognize bankrupt farms relieved of their debt, and most
will carry on with pro forma leases  and renewed credit.
The agricultural financial crisis at the macroeconomic level remains
11serious.  The direct subsidy  to pay the difference between costs  to
procure, process,  and transport  food and low retail prices  in 1989 was
87.8  billion rubles, and is budgeted to grow in 1990  to  95.7 billion.8
This is  approximately 11%  of GNP.  Three quarters of  the agricultural
subsidy pays  for meat and milk, as shown in Table  7.
The subsidy  is  remarkable not  only for its  size, but  for its  growth in
the  1980s.  Since  1985  the subsidy bill has increased 70%  (without
adjustment for  inflation).  Procurement price increases  and special
bonuses introduced in 1983 brought a large  increase, and the  subsidy  rose
thereafter as more farms  qualified for the bonuses  for financially weak
farms.  Higher levels  of production and imports push the subsidy up,  since
it  is paid on a larger volume.  In addition to  the price subsidy, there
are smaller budgetary expenditures for agricultural investment and
operating expenses.
The  agricultural price subsidy is  a contributor to macroeconomic
imbalance.  In  the  last two years  agriculture has been both perpetrator
and victim of  inflationary pressure.  Producer prices have moved up;
increased production alone cannot explain the increase in the subsidy.
The bonus  system channels  the increase  to marginal producers who show the
smallest supply response.  Prices and earnings  for lower cost producers
have  increased more moderately, and have not kept pace either with the
rise  in the general price level or movements  in world prices.
The food price subsidy has encroached on important social welfare
programs. 9 Budgetary expenditures  for health and education in 1987 were
48% higher than during 1976-80;  the food subsidy was  170% higher, as shown
in Table 8.  The safety net of social welfare programs needed for a more
12mobile  labor force,  including unemployment insurance  for the
transitionally unemployed and welfare  for the marginally employable will
be difficult to finance unless  the pressure of agriculture on the state
budget  is relieved.
The Reform:  Pre and Post March 1989
The March Plenum in 1989 was a turning point in the agricultural
reform.  At the time many observers  inside and the USSR and abroad were
disappointed  that the price reform was postponed, and that few concrete
measures emerged from the plenum.  The endorsement of leasing, however,
initiated a sequence of tenurial reforms  leading to  a greater degree of
independence for  small holders.  The tenurial reforms  are proving
difficult to  implement without changes in pricing, marketing, and
financial  institutions.  The  tenure reforms  themselves have not generated
a supply response, but they are highlighting the  impediments embodied in
current pricing, marketing, and financing arrangements, and may be a
catalyst for deeper reform.
It  is unfortunate that  the agricultural reform is  so  late in starting,
because the costs of adjustment are greater now than they would have been
in 1985.  Consumer markets are  farther out of equilibrium, the ruble
overhang is  larger, and world prices are higher.  In 1983  Soviet producers
receiving 100 rubles per ton did not seem particularly disadvantaged
compared to American producers receiving $116  in 1985 and $86  in 1986.
Now, with the ruble overhang yielding an exchange rate of 11  rubles to  the
dollar on the  legal, albeit thin, foreign exchange  auction market in
January, 1990, and world wheat prices ranging from $150  to $200 per ton,
100 rubles per ton is  a very low price.  It  is now more difficult to align
13Soviet producer prices with world prices  than it would have been when
world prices were  lower in the mid 1980s.  A radical price reform and
opening of the agricultural economy to world markets  in 1985,  instead of
Gosagroprom and the fictive collective contract, might have allowed the
Soviet economy to benefit instead of suffer  from the strong grain prices
of the  late 1980s and early 1990s.
Why was agriculture neglected?  Abel Aganbegyan was asked a similar
question in 1987:  Why not take agriculture first,  instead of  starting with
a very difficult and ambitious industrial  reform?  Aganbegyan responded,
"We did start  first with agriculture by establishing Gosagroprom and
encouraging introduction of the collective  contract."
10 Gosagroprom, the
collective contract, "intensive  technology" in grain production
(encouragement of proper agronomic practices and application of more
purchased inputs)  and minor changes  in marketing procedures in 1986
constituted the agrarian program of  the first four years of perestroika.
Output increased under this program, as evident in Table 1, but less than
needed to meet  the ambitious targets  for production and consumption.
Costs of production also increased, as shown in the rapidly rising subsidy
burden and escalating farm debt (Tables 6 and 7).
The centerpiece of the early Gorbachev agricultural program was  the
collective contract.  Collective contracts began to appear  in significant
numbers in the early 1980s,  and the campaign was increasingly associated
with Gorbachev personally after 1983.11  Under the collective contract, a
group of workers negotiated with the  farm management to perform a set of
tasks  in exchange for a specified payment.  The  group monitored the
performance of its members and divided earnings accordingly.
14The contracts included elaborate restatements of labor norms and bonus
payments  for specific  tasks.  Brigades were encouraged to  implement
monitoring and accounting schemes using the "coefficient of  labor
participation  [KTU]"  to apportion the new bonus among themselves.  This
was essentially the work point system of the pre-Brezhnev era, and workers
who violated discipline could be docked points in the final division of
earnings.  The collective contract as  originally conceived was consistent
with Andropov's  effort  to  instill tighter labor discipline.  Since the pay
of each brigade member depended at  least  in part on the performance of the
team, tolerance for widespread shirking and lax discipline was expected to
diminish.
The collective contract system shifted the job of monitoring labor
performance  from the farm manager to brigade members, and made them
residual claimants  of income.  It also  imposed upon them a form of
organization that had high costs of monitoring and accounting.  Use  of the
new work point system was cumbersome and tied brigade members to  the old
norms for job performance.  Many of the original brigades were large;  the
average in reported data is  25, but many were larger still.  Membership
was diverse and not self-selected.  The work point system with a
heterogeneous work force was cumbersome and costly to administer.  Few
brigades bothered to use the work point system, and distributed bonuses  in
proportion to base pay, as  they had under the old system.
The collective contract brought higher, not lower costs of production:
"Contract collectives tried to  increase output at any price, and did not
take costs  into account." 12 Workers negotiated wage  increases as a price
for monitoring themselves.  The base  tariff wage became the advance
15payment, and payment according to output functioned much as  the bonus
under the old system.  Higher wages coupled with poor control over
purchased inputs pushed costs of production up.
The collective contract brigade was  an unstable organization.  Between
1985 and 1987  many brigades dissolved and reconstitute themselves in a
search for lower monitoring costs.  Brigades reported as  successful in
the press were  increasingly small, although the  official aggregate data do
not show much diminution.  The aggregate data  include  the wholesale
rechristening of large traditional brigades as  collective contract
brigades, and the  simultaneous breakup of older collective  contract
brigades into smaller self-selected and family units.
Deteriorating finances at the farm and macro level  in late 1987 forced
a reevaluation of agricultural policy.13 Profiles of  successful
leaseholders  (arendatory) replaced those of  the collective contract
brigades  in the agricultural press, and many brigades reconstituted
themselves under new lease contracts.  At the March Plenum (1989),
Gorbachev reaffirmed his commitment to  the collective contract, but
observed,  "Experience has shown that there are more radical  forms of
management now based on long term leasing of land and other means of
production with full financial independence." 14 He went on to advocate
lease contracts  of 25  or even 50  year duration.
That the collective contract would not work could have been seen at the
micro  level even before  it was promoted at the national level  in 1985.
Rigorous  empirical analysis of  the experience  of farms that adopted the
collective contract would have shown that costs per unit  increased,
indicating that it was not an appropriate policy for augmenting
16efficiency.  In a failure both of  glasnost'  and of the agricultural
economics  profession, the evidence was neither carefully analyzed nor
presented.  The agricultural economics profession appears even now to
contribute little sound empirical analysis of the effects  of policies
adopted, or  quantitative estimates  of response to alternative policies
proposed.  An empirical foundation for public discourse  about the
agricultural reform is notably lacking.
The episode with the collective contract occurred when the press was
already very open about the ills  of the Brezhnev era, but the  collective
contract was not Brezhnev's program.  It was the policy most  intimately
linked with Gorbachev personally until the political and economic programs
of later perestroika strengthened his identification with a more
diversified program.  By 1989 Gorbachev could admit  that the collective
contract had failed.  In 1985 he apparently needed to believe and to
convince others that  it would work, and the  traditional campaign
mechanisms:  simulated grass-roots enthusiasm, compliant researchers, and a
self-censored press accommodated him.  It is paradoxical  that Gorbachev
began his  remarkable and salutary course toward pragmatism and democracy
by overseeing what one hopes was the  last of the great old-fashioned
campaigns.
The lease contract was the initial successor to  the collective
contract.  An individual or small group agrees  to  lease assets belonging
to  a state or collective farm or  individual proprietor in exchange for a
rental payment.  Lease contract groups  are small, self-selected, and
members are often related.  The  lessees do not receive a guaranteed wage,
and instead earn residual profits according to  the  stipulations of the
17contract.  In the past state or collective  farms have been the  lessors,
but if the draft  land law is passed, an individual proprietor will also
be able  to lease out land.
There are  two main forms of the  lease contract as  it  is now being
promoted.  The first  is called the targeted form.  It  is  the more common
and it binds producers quite closely to  the parent farm.  Targeted leases
can be simply repackaged traditional labor contracts or genuinely new
contractual relations,  depending on the  terms.  A family, individual, or
small group  contracts to  manage a portion of the  farm's  assets,  including
land, machinery, animals, and structures.  All  inputs and output are
marketed through the parent farm.  The contract specifies quantities  of
inputs that will be available and their prices, and  sets a target quantity
of output that should be delivered to the farm in fulfillment of the
contract.  The mechanism for collecting the rent  is  a difference between
the price the  lessee receives for output and the price at which the farm
resells output to  the state procurement organizations.
If the contracted minimal sale  is enforced, this becomes a combination
of fixed rent and share contract.  The fixed rent  is  the difference
between the contractual price and procurement price times  the specified
minimal delivery.  Earnings on deliveries  above the contracted minimum
are shared, with the share determined by the ratio between the contractual
and procurement prices.  It  is not likely that minimal deliveries can be
enforced, and the  targeted lease contract is best considered a share
contract with threat of revocation in the following period if deliveries
fall below the minimum.  Another form of share contract is based on share
of profit, not share of crop.
18Targeted leases are  intended now to be the main form of leasing.  As
long as  farm managers are  themselves still subject  to state orders  and
sales quotas,  they prefer targeted leases  that allow them to  retain
control over the product mix and input distribution.
The second form of lease  is  the  free or fixed rent contract.  This  is
considered suitable for land and assets  for which the manager of the
parent farm has little alternative use.  Small livestock operations  in the
nonblack soil zone far  from the central farm, or orchard, vegetable, and
flower operations that  are  too labor intensive for  the parent farm to
manage effectively are offered on fixed rent  leases.  Lessees under free
leases market their own output, although they may market through the
parent farm if both sides agree.  They also can have their own accounts  in
the bank.
Data on adoption of lease contracting are scarce and unreliable.  There
appears  to be no mechanism in place to monitor implementation or
distinguish new contractual forms from old.  Fragmentary data corroborate
the anecdotal evidence that  few people are signing leases.  As of mid
1989  in the Russian republic, 43%  of collective and state farms  reported
that they had signed at least one contract, and only 9% of agricultural
workers were working under leases,  some of which were undoubtedly not true
leaseholds.
1 5 At the end of 1989,  4,911 or 9% of state and collective
farms reported leasing activities, but it  is unclear whether all or part
of their assets were leased.
1 6 The offer of debt relief for  farms that
lease assets made in December 1989 will increase adoption and complicate
the distinction between genuine leaseholds and older forms of labor
organization.
19Several reasons are cited for slow adoption of leasing  in 1989:
1)  Farm managers do not want to  give up control over  their assets;  2)
potential lessees  do not like  to be  completely dependent on the  farm
manager for supply of  inputs  and marketing of output;  3)  Potential
lessees  take on greater risk in exchange  for expected returns  that may not
exceed the guaranteed wage;  4) Even if they earn more the increasing
disequilibrium on consumer markets  limits  the value of their earnings;  5)
The current pricing and marketing system discriminates against quasi-
independent operators;  and 6)  Leases do not provide security of tenure
even if they are written for as  long as  50 years.
Three important pieces of legislation were passed or proposed in late
1989  to  bolster the legal status  of independent agricultural producers.
The  laws  improve the  security of new forms  of tenure, but do  little to
improve their economic viability.
The Basic Law of The USSR and Union Republics on Leasing was  issued in
draft form in September, formally passed on November 23,  1989,  and took
effect January 1, 1990.17  The  draft version of the law on ownership was
issued November 14,  1989.18  The draft version of the new land law was
published on December 6.19
These pieces of legislation strengthen the  legal foundation for
property relations that deviate from  those of  traditional collectivized
agriculture, but they contain ambiguities and contradictions, many of
which relate  to  land ownership.  Each distinguishes between proprietorship
of land (vladenie) and ownership  (sobstvennost').  A proprietor cannot
buy, sell,  or mortgage  the asset, while an owner has  full rights of
disposition,  including sale and mortgage.  The  leasing law and drafts on
20land and ownership all sanction individual proprietorship of agricultural
land, but prohibit  full private ownership.  The prohibition on ownership
proved among the most contested provisions of the draft law.  In late
January, 1990,  the commission of the  Supreme Soviet charged with drawing
up a final form of  the land law for presentation to  the parliament was
reported to be leaning toward substituting ownership  (sobstvennost')  for
proprietorship  (vladenie), but specifying restrictions on purchases and
sales of agricultural land.20
Conditions restricting purchase and sale will be costly if retained in
the long run, but may be useful now.  The ruble  overhang, paucity of
investment assets, and fears of inflation and monetary reform would
rapidly drive land prices up  if land could be freely bought and sold now.
This would defeat the effort  to  encourage emergence of a group of
independent owner or proprietor operators.
The three pieces of legislation have conflicting language on who will
distribute  the land, and say little about how it will be done, other than
to note that laws at the level of the republic and autonomous region will
govern procedures  for confiscation of state and collective farm land for
reassignment to individual proprietors and leaseholders.  Despite their
ambiguity, the  laws alter the purely voluntaristic nature of leasing and
proprietorship.  Farm managers will no longer be able unilaterally to
thwart the desire of workers to have access  to land under new contractual
relations.
People seeking leaseholds  in the past expressed resentment over the
monopoly power of farm managers both to  set terms  and interfere in
managerial  decisions during the duration of the contract.  There are no
21systematic reported data yet on terms  of leases,  but reports  from the
agricultural press suggest that farms are exacting high rental  fees from
leaseholders.  In an example reported from Tselinograd oblast',  a
leaseholding brigade sold wheat to the parent farm for 7 rubles per
centner,  and the farm resold it  to the procurement agency for  13.21  It is
unclear from the account who paid for seed, fuel, fertilizer,  and other
purchased inputs, but these are usually paid in full by the lessee.  The
leaseholder's share  (54%)  in this case  seems quite  low if there  is  no cost
sharing.  Another set of contractual prices reported from Orlovskaia
oblast'  is  also quite low:
Contract Prices and State Procurement Prices
(Vyshne-Ol'shanskii State Farm, Orlov Oblast',  1988)
Contract Price  Procurement Price
grain  5.89 rub/cent  10.50  (wheat)1
sugar beets  2.75 rub/cent  5.402
potatoes  8.28 rub/cent  10  - 163
milk in winter  28.00 rub/cent  36.204
milk in summer  18.00 rub/cent
1.  This  is  the average price for the RSFSR.  The zonal price for
Orlovskaia oblast' may be lower, but not less  than 9 rubles  70 kopecks.
The price for this individual  farm may differ from the zonal price.  Rye
is  also grown in Orlov province.  The  state procurement price for rye on
average  in the RSFSR is  15 rubles per centner.
2.  Average for the RSFSR
3.  Depending on quality  and time of delivery
4.  Average, RSFSR, all  seasons
Sources:  Selskaia zhizn',  August 2, 1988,  and A. M. Chursin, Tseny i
kachestvo sel'skokhoziaistvennoi produktsii  (Moscow: Kolos, 1984).
22These contract prices are very low, and suggest a share of at least
40%  for the parent farm, although the  full parameters of the contract are
not reported.  The share  is probably even higher,  since bonus payments
raise farm prices above base procurement prices.
The question of whether share contracts  are inherently inefficient
and/or exploitive of tenants in market economies has generated a rich
literature exploring the nature of contracts.22 Throughout much of  the
developing world share rents are  on the order of 50%,  but these contracts
are usually complex agreements  including risk reduction and insurance,
shared costs of purchased inputs,  and provision of credit.  Crop share
rents are not uncommon in Minnesota now, and landlords'  shares range from
1/3 on poorer land to  1/2  on better land.23 These share  contracts
include very substantial sharing of costs.  Soviet share contracts
(targeted leases),  according to fragmentary and anecdotal evidence
available, appear to have high shares  for the parent farm and little if
any cost sharing.  The rent collected as  the difference between the
leaseholder's sale price and the farm's procurement price pays for land
use  (and costs,  if any, associated with marketing the final product).
The leaseholder pays for purchased  inputs either at the price  the parent
farm pays, or at an internal accounting price for inputs produced on the
farm, such as feed or  seed.
At 40% of output, rents  exacted from leaseholders probably exceed
land's contribution to output.  In production functions measured from
Lithuanian farm level data  the contribution of land to variation in net
output ranges from 5% to  15%.24  Technology and factor proportions differ
greatly throughout the Soviet agricultural sector, but shares of 40%  for
23land are probably excessive.
Concern about the  level of rental payments has had two consequences.
The  leasing law and the draft law on land both assign the rural Council of
People's Deputies  the power to  secure a land allotment  (either leasehold
or proprietorship) for any applicant qualified to work it.  Workers
dissatisfied with terms offered by their farm manager can apply to  the
Council  of People's Deputies, but the extent to which the Council will be
able  to  offset the manager's monopoly power has not yet been tested.
There is  a growing demand for standard procedures  for valuing contracted
assets, particularly land.  The problem of valuing land when markets are
absent  is a difficult one,  and no workable solution has yet been found. 25
Support for new tenurial forms  and property relations  at the highest
levels of  government and the party is divided.  Conservatives argue that
state and collective farms still have high potential as productive units,
and that  small scale contracting should be purely voluntary, not
implemented under pressure.  As a purely voluntary program throughout 1989
leasing made little progress.  Conservatives have the strength of inertia
working for them;  as long as  reforms  in pricing, marketing, financing, and
input supply can be postponed they retain the advantage, since new
tenurial forms function poorly in the old economic environment.
As the agrarian reform in 1989 became more  identified with new forms of
land tenure,  such as  lease contracting, proprietorship, and private
ownership, representatives of  state and collective  farms appeared
increasingly  to  identify with conservatives who cast themselves as
defenders of the untapped potential of collectivized agriculture.
Delegates to the most recent Congress of Kolkhozniki voted to oppose  the
24new land law legalizing individual proprietorships and granting village
councils the authority to confiscate  collective or  state farm land for
proprietors' allotments.
Collective and state farm managers  in the past had a litany of
complaints against the status quo,  including precisely the problems with
pricing, marketing, financing, and input supply that a reform should
address.  These complaints have not been harnessed to the cause of
radical reform.  Economically viable low cost producers, the best of the
state and collective farms, have much to gain from a program that diverts
resources to them and away from marginal producers, as would a market
oriented reform.  The most rapid supply response  to  reform is  likely to
come from measures  such as price reform that benefit the best of the
existing farms  and simultaneously allow the emergence  of a new sector of
independent smallholders.  The conservative defenders  of the untapped
potential of collective and state  farms want to preserve marginal farms
and upgrade the capital stock on all  farms, rather than release the
constraints on efficient resource use that have historically plagued
collectivized agriculture.
Neither the radical nor the conservative program addresses the acute
immediate needs of the better Soviet farms  for more rational prices,
timely delivery of high quality rationally priced purchased inputs and
services, easy access to markets, and autonomy to do the job as they see
fit.  An economy composed of many independent efficient small holders  is  a
laudable objective, but it will not bring a supply response this  season or
next, and it  is not inconsistent with measures that would.
The emphasis on tenurial reform in 1989 appears to rest on the
25assumption that new contractual  relations will bring a supply response
independent of reforms in pricing, marketing, finance,  and input supply.
Increased supply would, according to  this  view, ease shortages  and make
consumers more willing to accept price reform.  Successful tenure reform
is  apparently considered a precursor to changes  in the  economic
environment.
This  strategy is  flawed for several reasons.  Without higher prices
consumer markets are so  out of equilibrium that even a substantial supply
response simply will go unnoticed.  Consumers do not know whether they ate
67  kilograms of meat  last year or  70;  they know only whether  they can buy
meat  in the stores.  If tenure reform does bring a supply response,  it
will be felt  in the longer, not the short, run.  Moreover, the Soviet
experience with lease contracting in 1989 demonstrates how difficult it  is
to  reform tenure relations without changing pricing and marketing.
The current distorted pricing system impedes reform of land tenure and
marketing.  Land has historically been offered to farms  in the Soviet
Union without charge.  The state has collected implicit land rents through
differentiated, farm specific output prices.  Under reforms  introduced in
1989,  leaseholders pay the parent farms  for land use, but the collective
and state  farms  do not yet pay the state.  If land  is  leased out by the
farm that now commands  its use,  the farm manager, in negotiating the
contract, will demand at minimum recovery of producer rents inherent  in
the price system.  Those rents are  substantial because differentiated
output prices are  a poor instrument for collecting rents.
The valuation of land through the bargaining process inherent  in
leasing without price reform is both highly idiosyncratic and distorted
26relative to the post-reform price  structure.  In the absence  of a land
market, there are  few reliable  guides for valuing land.  Yet the
assignment or reassignment of property rights without valuation and
transfers confers windfall  gains to recipients.  The multiplicity of
prices complicates the contractual negotiations and leads  to monetization
of current distorted asset values.
Price reform, assignment of user fees  for all categories  of
agricultural producers, not just independent operators,  and changes in
marketing of inputs and output will spur adoption of new tenurial forms.
They will furthermore improve the economic environment for the better
state and collective farms,  and promote the much needed supply response.
27Conclusions
Five years of perestroika have not remedied chronic problems of Soviet
agriculture.  In 1989 difficulties of more recent origin;  i.e.,  transport
problems, growing excess  demand, and a deteriorating distribution system
worsened the performance of the agricultural economy and heightened
public anxiety about  food supply.  Agricultural policies adopted in 1985
failed, and were replaced in 1989  by an effort  to change fundamental
tenurial and contractual relations of collectivized agriculture.  These
tenure reforms have become increasingly radical, and offer managers and
workers who choose to  remain with the better collective and state farms
little reason to be enthusiastic about the cause of reform, and little
opportunity to  improve their farms'  performance.  These  farms will have to
be  the source of the  short run supply response that the  economy so needs,
but without reform of prices, marketing, credit, and input supply they
will do  little.  Reforms  in pricing, marketing, input supply, and credit
are also necessary if the new tenurial forms  are to be economically viable
and attractive to  agricultural workers.  The problem of land valuation
shows this clearly:  leasing and private ownership or proprietorship
require land valuation, but the  current distorted price  system yields
nonsensical and irrational land values.
The  tenure reforms of 1989  and 1990 are  important but incomplete
without corollary changes  in the economic environment that will make them
work, and improve the performance of the better state and collective
farms.  The  agricultural reform has  thus hardly begun, and it  must move
ahead quickly if this  sector is  to promote  rather  than hinder perestroika.
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31Table  1:  Soviet Agricultural Production
Annual average
Commodity  1981-85  1986-89  1987  1988  1989
(million metric  tons)
Grain (uncleaned)  180.3  206.9  211.4  195.0  211.1
Grain  (cleaned)  168.8  191.1  180.2  196.4
Sugarbeets  76.4  88.9  90.4  87.8  97.5
Sunflowerseed  5.0  6.1  6.1  6.2  7.0
Cotton  (raw)  8.3  8.4  8.1  8.7  8.6
Potatoes  78.4  74.4  75.9  62.7  72.0
Vegetables and melons  33.3  33.9  34.5  33.5
Fruits and Berries  10.4  9.6  8.2  8.9  9.9
Grapes  7.1  5.7  5.6  4.9
Meat
(slaughter weight)  16.2  18.8  18.9  19.7  20:0
Milk  94.6  104.1  103.8  106.8  108.1
Eggs  (billions)  74.4  82.7  82.7  85.2  84.6
Wool  (1,000 tons)  457  469  461  476  474
Source:  "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie SSSR v 1989 godu"
Ekonomika  i zhizn',  No. 6, February, 1990.
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h)C,  n  33Table  3:  World Wheat Prices
$/ metric  ton
US Gulf Ports  Rotterdam
Hard Winter, f.o.b.  #2 dark northern
spring c.i.f.
1980  176  213
1981  176  210
1982  161  187
1983  158  185
1984  153  180
1985  137  169
1986  117  148
1987  114  141
1988  146  165
1989
Jan.  175  205
Feb.  173  207
Mar.  179  192
Sept.  164  180
Source:  Wheat Outlook and Situation Report, USDA ERS November  1989.
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Collective Farm Market Prices Relative to  State Retail Prices
(State Prices - 100)
1980  1985  1986  1987  1989/1988
a
All Products  257  263  263  272  . 107
Plant Products  265  265  263  275
Potatoes  360  351  361  345  108
Vegetables  250  269  269  282  110
Fresh Cabbage  425  406  412  458
Onion  199  260  257  212
Beets  678  661  628  725
Carrots  494  464  470  490
Fruit  238  222  212  230
Vegetable Oil  172  193  198  207
Animal Products  242  257  260  264
Meat  239  253  256  259  106
Milk Products  323  383  402  410
a:  Increase  in kolkhoz market prices 1989  relative to  1988.
Source:  Ekonomika i zhizn' No.  6 February 1990.
36Table 6
Agricultural Debt Relative to Total Bank Debt
USSR (billion rubles)
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1987
Total Bank  46.5  74  126.2  204  342.5  521.3  432.1
Debt
Short Term  3.0  4.5  8.6  25.5  57.6  82.3  87.0
Agricultural
Debt
Long Term  2.4  3.9  10.8  22.9  42.4  57.1  61.0
Agricultural
Debt
Total  5.4  8.4  19.4  48.4  100.0  139.4  148.0
Agricultural
Debt
Agricultural  11.6%  11.3%  15.3%  23.7%  29.2%  26.7%  34.2%
Debt as
% of Total
Sources:  Narodnoe khozlaistvo SSSR 1980  p. 528
Narodnoe khozlaistvo SSSR 1987  p. 595
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